As regards direct discrimination, the Court held that for an internal rule to constitute direct discrimination, the criteria governing the wearing of the signs must be inextricably linked to one or more particular religions or beliefs. In other words, there is no direct discrimination if the rule applies without distinction to all expressions of philosophical or religious beliefs and treats all employees of the company or organisation in the same way by requiring them to dress neutrally in a general and non-differentiated manner.
Unless the national court were to find that, despite the general and undifferentiated way in which the labour regulations were formulated, the employee was treated differently from other employees who were allowed to express their particularly religious or philosophical beliefs by wearing a visible sign, there is no direct discrimination.
As regards indirect discrimination, the Court recalls that indirect discrimination occurs when the apparently neutral obligation set out in the internal rule in fact results in a particular disadvantage to persons who have a particular religion or belief, without such difference in treatment being objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim being appropriate and necessary. While the national court has final jurisdiction to assess the facts, the Court has jurisdiction to give directions.
The municipality argued that the internal rule aims to give effect to the principle of public service neutrality (which has its legal basis in the Belgian Constitution, the principle of impartiality and the principle of state neutrality). The Court ruled that each Member State (including local authorities within the powers assigned to them) has a degree of discretion in shaping the neutrality of the public service that the Member State wishes to promote at work. Thus, depending on its own specific context, the policy of "exclusive neutrality" can be considered objectively justified by a legitimate purpose. The same applies equally to different neutrality policies that another public administration would opt for according to its own specific context, such as a general permission to wear visible signs of philosophical or religious beliefs, including in contacts with the public, or a ban on wearing those signs limited to situations where such contacts exist. Whether it is appropriate for a government to pursue neutrality is thus a question on which the Court does not rule. In the judgment, the Court is giving a lot of leeway to the Member States, which will have to make a final decision on whether a ban is justified in the event of a dispute.
Next, the Court indicated that the internal rule must also be appropriate to ensure the proper application of the objective pursued. The Court indicates that, in this particular case, this presumes that the objective of "exclusive neutrality" is effectively pursued coherently and systematically and that the prohibition on wearing visible signs does not go beyond what is strictly necessary, which is for the national court to ascertain.
In this context, the Court noted that the legitimate aim of ensuring a completely neutral public environment through a policy of "exclusive neutrality" can be effectively pursued only if no visible manifestation of philosophical or religious beliefs is allowed; any sign - even a small one - undermines the appropriateness of the measure to achieve the alleged aim and thus the coherence of that policy.